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T he aim of this paper is to discuss the role of structural economic models in empirical analysis and policy design. This approach offers some valuable payoffs, but also imposes some costs. 
Structural economic models focus on distinguishing clearly between the objec-
tive function of the economic agents and their opportunity sets as defined by the 
economic environment. The key features of such an approach at its best are a tight 
connection with a theoretical framework alongside a clear link with the data that 
will allow one to understand how the model is identified. The set of assumptions 
under which the model inferences are valid should be clear: indeed, the clarity of 
the assumptions is what gives value to structural models. 
The central payoff of a structural econometric model is that it allows an empir-
ical researcher to go beyond the conclusions of a more conventional empirical 
study that provides reduced-form causal relationships. Structural models define 
how outcomes relate to preferences and to relevant factors in the economic envi-
ronment, identifying mechanisms that determine outcomes. Beyond this, they 
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are designed to analyze counterfactual policies, quantifying impacts on specific 
outcomes as well as effects in the short and longer run. 
The short-run implications can often be compared to what actually happened 
in the data, allowing for validation of the model. For example, Blundell, Costa Dias, 
Meghir, and Shaw (2016) model how life-cycle female labor supply and human 
capital accumulation are affected by tax credit reform. They validate the model 
by comparing its short-run predictions to those estimated by simple reduced form 
methods. However, their model also has implications for labor supply and wages 
beyond the childbearing age, as well as for the educational choice of subsequent 
cohorts, none of which can be estimated from actual data without an economic 
model. Such effects are of central importance for understanding the impacts of 
welfare programs. Similarly, Low and Pistaferri (2015) model the long-run effects of 
reform to disability insurance, but validate their model using reduced form predic-
tions. This symbiotic interaction of structural models and reduced form approaches, 
including randomized experiments, provides the strongest tool in the empirical 
economics toolkit and is emphasized in this paper.
Additional insights come with tradeoffs. Structural economic models cannot 
possibly capture every aspect of reality, and any effort to do so would make them 
unwieldy for either theoretical insight or applied analysis. There will always be 
some economic choices left out of any particular model—the key question is how 
to judge what aspects to leave out without rendering the quantitative conclusions of 
the model irrelevant. The principle we advocate to focus on the question of interest, 
to achieve parsimony, and to understand how much the model distorts reality is 
the concept of separability (related to Fisher’s separation theorem and Gorman’s 
notion of separability, as discussed in Gorman 1995). This leads to the concept of 
sufficient statistics, which summarize decisions made outside the model. A specific 
example is that of consumer two-stage budgeting: the first stage defines the total 
amount to be spent in a particular period, while the second stage allocates that 
expenditure to a variety of goods within the period. In modeling the within-period 
allocation, we may not concern ourselves with what determines the intertemporal 
allocation problem: under suitable separability assumptions, a sufficient statistic for 
the intertemporal allocation decision is total consumption (MaCurdy 1983; Altonji 
1986; Blundell and Walker 1986; Arellano and Meghir 1992). 
The validity of the abstraction of a structural model depends on how appro-
priate the particular separability assumptions being made are. This sort of abstraction 
is present even if we are modeling a market equilibrium that considers both the 
supply and demand sides. We focus on a limited system, because anything more 
would be too complicated to offer insights. For example, we may model the equilib-
rium in the labor market and pay determination but say nothing explicitly about the 
product market or capital investment (for example, Burdett and Mortensen 1998).
Structural economic models should be taught and used as part of the stan-
dard toolkit for empirical economists. Of course, other parts of that toolkit include 
treatment effect models based on quasi-experimental methods and random-
ized experiments, but these present trade-offs of their own: in particular, the 
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interpretation of data can become limited and fragmented without the organizing 
discipline of economic models. Further, without the ability to simulate counterfac-
tuals and more generally to make claims of external validity, the role of empirical 
analysis is limited to analyzing historical past events without being able to use this 
accumulated knowledge in a constructive and organized way. 
Solving structural models, especially dynamic stochastic models, involves 
numerical methods. These numerical methods are used to simulate outcomes and 
counterfactuals as well as to generate moments for use in estimation. The greatest 
“entry cost” for a researcher wishing to estimate dynamic structural models is 
learning to solve them, and as we discuss, there are many steps involved in their 
solution and estimation. Understanding their solution also helps in understanding 
how they are identified by the data.
In what follows, we start by defining structural models, distinguishing between 
those that are fully specified and those that are partially specified. We contrast the 
treatment effects approach with structural models, using Low, Meghir, and Pista-
ferri (2010) as an example of how a structural model is specified and the particular 
choices that were made. We follow with a discussion of combining structural esti-
mation with randomized experiments. We then turn to numerical techniques for 
solving dynamic stochastic models that are often used in structural estimation, again 
using Low, Meghir, and Pistaferri as an example. The penultimate section focuses 
on issues of estimation using the method of moments. The last section concludes.
Defining a Structural Model 
We begin by differentiating between fully and partially specified structural 
models, and then consider their relationship to treatment effect models. 
Fully Specified Structural Models
Fully specified structural models make explicit assumptions about the economic 
actors’ objectives and their economic environment and information set, as well as 
specifying which choices are being made within the model. We call these models 
fully specified because they allow a complete solution to the individual’s optimiza-
tion problem as a function of the current information set. In the context of labor 
economics, Keane and Wolpin (1997) and numerous papers by these authors are 
prime examples of fully specified structural models. Structural models are the foun-
dation for empirical work in industrial organization with key references being Berry, 
Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) and Koujianou-Goldberg (1995); however, most of 
our discussion draws from examples in labor economics and public finance.
A fully specified dynamic model of consumption and labor force participa-
tion will account for how employment and savings decisions are made, taking 
into account future expectations as well as future implications of these decisions. 
Working today can imply changes in future wages because of skill accumulation, 
thus altering the future returns to work and/or through changes in the preferences 
36     Journal of Economic Perspectives
for work (habit formation). The choices that the individual makes depend on beliefs 
about future opportunities (such as wage rates) and future preferences. Thus, in a 
fully specified model we need to define the distribution of random events (such as 
shocks to wages and human capital) often specifying the explicit functional form of 
the distributions and their persistence. We specify the dynamics of other observable 
or unobservable variables that affect decisions, distinguishing endogenous changes 
(such as to wealth due to saving decisions, or to human capital as a result of experi-
ence) from exogenous changes (such as to prices or to health). These features are 
all assumed to be in the individual’s information set. 
Of course no model is literally complete—all models necessarily abstract from 
possibly relevant choices. These simplifications take two forms: a choice variable may 
be completely absent from a model, as for example, in the simplest life-cycle model 
of consumption under uncertainty, which ignores labor supply and takes income 
to be some exogenous stochastic process. Low (2005) shows that this assumption 
can lead to underestimates of precautionary saving behaviour. Alternatively we 
may condition on a choice, but take it as economically exogenous, as discussed 
in Browning and Meghir (1991). For example, life-cycle behavior may depend on 
education, but the level of education is taken as given in modeling consumption: 
the solution of the consumption function will be conditional on education choice. 
To illustrate the issues, consider the structural model in Low, Meghir, and 
Pistaferri (2010). This is a life-cycle model of consumption and labor supply with a 
specific focus on quantifying employment and wage risk and measuring the welfare 
cost of risk, with implications for the design of welfare programs. Individuals choose 
whether to work, whether to change jobs if the opportunity arises, and how much 
to save. 
The first step is to specify the components of the model. A first component is the 
intertemporal utility function describing preferences and defining what is chosen. 
A second component is the intertemporal budget constraint, which depends on the 
available welfare benefits and taxes. Finally, we need to specify how the individual 
forms expectations about the future, including shocks to human capital and job loss 
probabilities and opportunities for new jobs. More broadly, we need to specify how 
preferences are defined over time and over the states of the world and whether the 
individual is an expected utility maximizer. Together this characterizes the problem 
facing the individual. These components also define parameters that need to be 
estimated from the data after we have argued for how they are identified. 
We also need to decide what not to model. Of course, this list of omissions is 
a long one, but for models of life-cycle behavior, the most glaring omissions are 
marriage and fertility: in our example, male preferences are assumed to be sepa-
rable from these, as is often done in the literature on male labor supply. Education 
is taken as given (although it affects choices and opportunity sets). Overall savings 
are explained but not portfolio allocations. Finally, the model is partial equilibrium, 
in the sense that counterfactual simulations abstract from changes in wages that 
may result from aggregate changes in the supply of labor. Perhaps more impor-
tantly, the model abstracts from aggregate shocks. This means that the results have 
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little to say about how the welfare effects of idiosyncratic risk vary with the state 
of the aggregate economy. The judgment is that these other aspects obscure and 
complicate the model rather than offer important insights given the stated aims. 
The complications of these extensions are also partly numerical, as we discuss later 
in this paper. 
Some assumptions are made for simplicity and focus, but others are identifying 
assumptions. For example, the specific distribution of the shocks may be an iden-
tifying assumption. A crucial question that arises is the minimal set of assumptions 
needed for the model to have empirical content and thus be empirically identi-
fied. These issues have been much discussed from different perspectives: useful 
starting points include Rust (1992) and Magnac and Thesmar (2002). Overall, their 
conclusion is that dynamic discrete choice models need some strong identification 
assumptions to work. These assumptions can be relaxed somewhat if a continuous 
outcome variable is involved such as wages (Heckman and Navarro 2007). 
The payoff of such assumptions is that we are able to construct a model that 
is complex in the important dimensions and relatively transparent in the implied 
mechanisms. In Low, Meghir, and Pistaferri (2010), there are two separate sources of 
risk—employment and productivity—and a particularly complex budget constraint 
specifying the details of the available welfare programs. The relative simplicity of 
the specification hides important numerical complexities because the consump-
tion function may be discontinuous in assets due to the discrete labor supply. 
The stochastic process of wages is serially correlated, increasing the numerical 
complexity of the problem. However, within this structure, it is still relatively easy to 
understand the role of the various sources of risk and how they affect welfare and 
the way we evaluate various welfare programs. Whether the channel of changed 
fertility decisions resulting from welfare reform is important for this problem is of 
course an open question. 
Fully specified structural models are particularly useful when we want to 
understand long-term effects of policy. In a recent paper, Blundell, Costa Dias, 
Meghir, and Shaw (2016) consider the impact on female careers of tax credits 
targeted to low-income families with children. A key question is whether tax credits 
improve longer-term labor market attachment of single mothers by incentivizing 
them to remain in work and thus avoiding human capital depreciation during the 
child-rearing period of life. The model quite decisively concludes this is not the 
case, partly because tax credits in the UK promote part-time work, which is not 
conducive to building up human capital, and partly because of tax-credit-induced 
disincentives to work for women within relationships (relative to the situation 
for single/divorced women). On the other hand, the model also shows that tax 
credits are by far superior to other commonly used methods of social insurance 
because of reduced moral hazard. Again, the specification of this model has made 
a number of simplifying assumptions, the most pertinent of which is to condition 
on the fertility process and not allow it to change as a result of welfare reform. 
Despite these sorts of limitations, a structural model that fully specifies behavior 
can go much further than simply estimating a parameter of interest or testing a 
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particular theoretical hypothesis. To achieve this, a number of simplifying assump-
tions have to be made, to maintain feasibility and some level of transparency. The 
key is that the assumptions are made explicit, allowing future research to question 
results and make progress on that basis. 
The discussion would be incomplete without touching upon empirical equilib-
rium models. Indeed, there are no better examples of completely specified models 
than those that also address equilibrium issues, since counterfactual analysis takes 
into account how the interaction between agents on both sides of the market leads 
to a new outcome. This requires specifying the behavior of all relevant agents and 
defining equilibrium in the specific context. At the same time, this provides an 
excellent example of how studies focus on some key features of equilibrium but not 
on others; this is both because of the need for focus on a particular question and 
for keeping modeling and computational complexity in check. Heckman, Lochner, 
and Taber (1998) and Lee and Wolpin (2008) focus on changes in equilibrium 
in the labor market; Abbott, Gallipoli, Meghir, and Violante (2013) also focus on 
the labor market equilibrium but in addition endogenize intergenerational links. 
Chiappori, Costa Dias, and Meghir (forthcoming), on the other hand, focus on 
equilibrium in the marriage market and on intrahousehold allocations, but do not 
consider changes in the labor market equilibrium, keeping wages constant. The 
search literature focuses on how equilibrium in frictional labor markets affects wage 
determination, as in the seminal paper of Burdett and Mortensen (1998) and a list 
of further important contributions too long to discuss here. All these studies esti-
mate equilibrium models in some dimension but abstract from adjustments that are 
not the prime focus of the study. In so doing, they offer empirical insights on some 
of the important mechanisms at work in the longer run.
Partially Specified Structural Models 
Sometimes our focus is on one component of a fully specified model. Consider 
an individual who maximizes lifetime utility by choosing consumption, savings, 
and how much to work in each period. We can derive a within-period labor supply 
function that is consistent with intertemporal choices but does not fully charac-
terize them. Essentially, this is a reorganization of the marginal rate of substitution 
between consumption and labor supply. Such models rely on a sufficient statistic that 
summarizes choices not being modeled explicitly. In this case, the sufficient statistic 
is the amount of consumption allocated to the period. The econometric model 
defines a relationship between labor supply and wages, conditional on consumption 
and “looks” like a traditional labor supply model. The model is partially specified, 
in the sense that there is not enough information to solve for the optimal choice 
as a function of the information set: for example, the labor supply model resulting 
from the marginal rate of substitution characterization is silent about expectations 
for the future, the distribution of shocks, and the functioning of credit markets. 
However, conditioning on consumption makes the relationship between labor 
supply and wages valid and dependent upon structural parameters that characterize 
some aspects of utility. By studying this relationship, we can learn something about 
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preferences and about the validity of this marginal rate of substitution representa-
tion, but we cannot simulate counterfactuals. 
This idea builds on the concept of separability and two-stage budgeting intro-
duced by Gorman (for example, Gorman 1995). In the context of empirical labor 
supply, this approach has been developed by MaCurdy (1983), Altonji (1986), and 
Blundell and Walker (1986), where separability is a restriction on preferences. More 
generally, separability is a way of specifying conditions on preferences and technolo-
gies that allow us to focus on some aspect of economic behavior without having 
to deal explicitly with the broader complications of understanding all aspects of 
behavior at once. In other words, it formalizes what we mean by a partially specified 
model and offers a way of understanding where misspecification may occur, which 
would be a failure of the explicit or implicit separability assumptions.
Partially specified structural models are an important empirical tool. They 
define testable implications for theory and allow us to estimate important param-
eters (such as the intertemporal elasticity of substitution or the Marshallian wage 
elasticity) in a way that is robust to different specifications in the parts of the model 
that remain unspecified, as discussed in the early simultaneous equations literature 
as well as Browning and Meghir (1991) and recently in Attanasio, Levell, Low, and 
Sanchez-Marcos (2017), amongst many others. They are explicit about what is kept 
constant when considering changes in variables and as such can provide consistent 
estimates for the parameters, given appropriate econometric methods. However, 
unlike fully specified models, the counterfactual analysis based on these is incom-
plete: for example, simulating the effect of taxes using a labor supply model that 
conditions on consumption will be limited by the inability of the model to capture 
the resulting intertemporal reallocation of consumption.
One of the most analyzed partially specified models is the Euler equation for 
consumption. It results from an assumption of intertemporally optimizing indi-
viduals and rational expectations. It does not require explicit information on the 
budget constraint because the level of consumption is used as a sufficient statistic 
for the marginal utility of wealth. This formulation has been the workhorse for 
examining the presence of liquidity constraints and for estimating the parameter 
of intertemporal substitution (for example, Attanasio and Weber 1995; Blundell, 
Browning, and Meghir 1994; Zeldes 1989). The often-used value for the elasticity 
of intertemporal substitution of about one originates from this body of work. Simi-
larly, much has been learned by the analysis of the Euler equation for investment 
with adjustment costs (Bond and Meghir 1994). However, for counterfactual anal-
ysis, such as the impact of taxation on savings, the model needs to be completed by 
specifying the full economic environment as discussed above. 
Treatment Effect Models
A treatment effect model focuses on identifying a specific causal effect of a 
policy or intervention while attempting to say the least possible about the theo-
retical context. The question is: following a policy change (like the introduction 
of an education subsidy, or a change in a welfare program), can we estimate the 
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impact on a specific outcome such as education, labor supply, or perhaps transfers 
between individuals, without specifying a complete model or tying the result to a 
specific theory? Treatment effect models and their role in program evaluation are 
developed in Heckman and Robb (1985), Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith (1999), 
and a subsequent large literature. 
The cleanest way of estimating program or treatment effects is experiments 
where interventions are randomly allocated. Given that in social contexts, compli-
ance with the treatment protocol cannot usually be enforced—that is, subjects 
allocated to treatment (such as job training) cannot be forced to accept treatment—
the randomized experiment will identify the effect of being offered treatment, or the 
intention to treat. Since impacts are possibly heterogeneous, the effect will be an 
average impact over the population for which randomization took place. 
In a treatment model, identification does depend on the assumption that the 
experiment has not been compromised (either by nonadherence to the protocol 
or by attrition) and on there being no spillovers from the treatment units (individ-
uals or communities or other groups such as schools) to the control ones, whether 
directly or through equilibrium mechanisms like price changes and peer effects. 
Given these important qualifications, we need not assume much about the under-
lying model of behavior. To get anything more than that out of the experiment, 
broadening its external validity, will typically require an explicit model, incorpo-
rating behavioral and often functional form assumptions. 
Sometimes the result of the intention to treat is exactly what we want. However, 
consider estimating the effect of a welfare program by randomizing its availability 
(such as randomizing a conditional cash transfer that incentivizes child education 
and maternal health care, as in Mexico’s PROGRESA). The welfare program may 
change current incentives to work or obtain education, future opportunities, the 
amount of risk households face, as well as the possibilities of risk-sharing in the 
communities (for example, Angelucci and De Giorgi 2009). It may even change 
wages in the affected communities (which it did). The treatment-effects model will 
isolate the impact of the program on any outcome we look at, but on its own will 
not be informative about the mechanisms. This limits the lessons from a particular 
experiment that are generalizable. To obtain more, we need to combine the infor-
mation from the experiment with a model of household behavior and study how 
equilibrium in the communities changes. And of course generalizing the results to 
a scaled-up version of the policy is impossible without a model.
The literature on the effects of taxing higher incomes, discussed in Goolsbee, 
Hall, and Katz (1999) and Gruber and Saez (2002), provides another example of 
the issues that arise. Feldstein (1995) measured the impact of decreasing the top 
tax rate on earnings and incomes by using the 1986 Tax Reform Act. Separate from 
the issue of the particular merits of this empirical approach to identifying the causal 
impact, the external validity of the exercise is limited by the fact that the overall 
effect of reducing the top tax rate depends on how the entire tax schedule was 
changed and how people are distributed across it, which reduces the generality 
of the result to the specific context. Even when there is apparent randomization, 
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such as in the comparison between lottery winners and losers in Imbens, Rubin, 
and Sacerdote (2001), there is still a threat to external validity: those choosing to 
participate in the lottery are likely to be those whose behavior will be most affected 
by winning, as shown by Crossley, Low, and Smith (2016).
Not all treatment effect models are created equal: it is important to distinguish 
those estimated through randomized experiments from those estimated through 
quasi-experimental methods, such as difference-in-differences, regression discon-
tinuity, matching, and others. The point of randomized experiments is that results 
do not depend on strong assumptions about individual behavior, if we are able to 
exclude the important issues discussed above. However, this clarity is lost with quasi-
experimental approaches such as difference-in-differences, where the validity of 
the results typically depends on assumptions relating to the underlying economic 
behavior that are left unspecified. For example, Athey and Imbens (2006) show that 
the assumption underlying difference-in-differences is that the outcome variable in 
the absence of treatment is generated by a model that is (strictly) monotonic in the 
unobservables, and the distribution of such unobservables must be invariant over 
time. These assumptions restrict the class of behavioral models that are consistent 
with the causal interpretation of difference in differences. 
For example, suppose we want to estimate the effects of an intervention to 
increase the years of education. The difference-in-differences approach assumes 
that the level of education (in the absence of intervention) will be a strictly mono-
tonic function of just one unobservable. Education is typically driven by the 
comparison of the benefits of education and the costs of education. The benefit 
can be expressed as the life-cycle value of wages and other outcomes resulting from 
an education choice. This benefit will in general be a nonlinear function of hetero-
geneity in wage returns, particularly if individuals are risk-averse. The costs are also 
likely to be heterogeneous. So the education choice will generally depend on at 
least two unobserved components, which are unlikely to collapse into one element 
of heterogeneity. In this case, the model of education will not satisfy the Athey and 
Imbens (2006) assumptions and a difference-in-differences analysis of an interven-
tion will not have a causal interpretation. 
To make things worse, if the outcome variable is discrete (such as “working” 
or “not working”) then a point estimate in difference-in-differences can only be 
achieved by assuming a functional form: the literature is replete with linear prob-
ability models estimating impacts using difference-in-differences. These models 
look simple and straightforward, but the interpretation of their results as causal 
impacts rely on strong behavioral and functional-form assumptions. In contrast, 
results from randomized evaluations “only” rely on the integrity of the experiment 
itself, including of course, the absence of spillovers. 
A further issue is the local nature of the results when the impacts of a policy 
are heterogeneous. This is best illustrated by the regression discontinuity approach, 
which identifies impacts for individuals who happen to be located close to the 
discontinuity. Thus while regression discontinuity has some qualities of a random-
ized experiment (in the sense that being on either side of the discontinuity is 
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assumed effectively random), in contrast to the experimental approach, the impact 
is local to a very specific group of people defined by proximity to the discontinuity. 
These concerns are more broadly relevant for quasi-experimental approaches as 
discussed in Imbens and Angrist (1994) and in Heckman and Vytlacil (2005).
In short, randomized experiments provide causal effects without having to 
refer to a specific economic model or structure. Quasi-experimental approaches 
on the other hand, while not focusing on structural parameters, rely on underlying 
assumptions about behavior that potentially limit the interpretability of the results 
as causal. The attraction of these approaches is their simplicity. However their 
usefulness is limited by the lack of a framework that can justify external validity, 
which in general requires a more complete specification of the economic model 
that will allow the mechanisms to be analyzed and the conclusions to be transferred 
to a different set of circumstances. This is one of the key advantages of structural 
models: they describe the mechanisms through which effects operate and thus 
provide the framework for understanding how a particular policy may translate in 
different environments. 
Combining Randomized Experiments and Structural Modeling 
A combination of a fully specified model and randomized experiments can 
enhance analysis in ways that either of the two approaches alone would miss. Indeed, 
one of the most important recent advances in empirical economics uses dynamic 
structural models with exogenous sources of variation. The idea is of course not 
new and goes back at least to Orcutt and Orcutt (1968) as well as to the evaluation 
of the Gary negative income tax experiment in Burtless and Hausman (1978). Also, 
Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980) combine information from quasi-experimental vari-
ation to infer structural relations in a twins study to analyze the quality–quantity 
model of fertility. 
The renewed interest in this approach brings together the advantages of cred-
ible evaluation that relies on randomized experiments or (arguably) exogenous 
variation induced by policy changes, with the systematic economic analysis of struc-
tural models. A couple of prominent examples include Blundell, Duncan, and 
Meghir (1998) who use changes in the structure of wages and tax policy reforms to 
identify a partial model of labor supply, and Kaboski and Townsend (2011) who esti-
mate a model of household investment and borrowing and validate its predictions 
using Thai data drawn from an expansion of microfinance availability in a large set 
of villages. 
Experimental evidence can be used either to validate a structural model or to 
aid in the estimation process. These two alternative ways of using the same exper-
imental evidence can be illustrated by comparing Todd and Wolpin (2006) and 
Attanasio, Meghir, and Santiago (2012). In 1998, the Mexican government experi-
mented with a conditional cash transfer program whose intention was to increase 
the school participation of children in poor rural areas and improve preventive 
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health care participation by mothers. PROGRESA, as the program became known, 
was to be evaluated by a cluster randomized control trial. Out of a population of 
506 poor rural communities, 320 were assigned to receive the program immediately, 
while the remaining ones were kept back as a control, only receiving the program 
two years later. PROGRESA consisted of offering nutritional supplements to young 
children and a subsidy to families (disbursed to the mother) conditional on chil-
dren’s attendance at school. Mothers had to attend health clinics regularly to be 
eligible. 
The intervention was highly successful. Schultz (2004) carried out the main 
evaluation of the program and shows that schooling participation increased. But 
can we learn more from the experiment and the associated data than the magni-
tude of the treatment effect? Specifically, can we say something about the design 
of the program and more generally, something about how costs of schooling affect 
educational participation?
In a standard economic model, the conditional school grants change school 
participation by counteracting the opportunity cost of schooling. Todd and Wolpin 
(2006) use this insight to validate a model of education attendance and fertility. 
They estimate the model based on data from the control group only. They then 
predict the impact of the experiment by reducing the wage in the model by an 
amount equivalent to the grant when the child went to school. They thus use the 
experiment to validate a dynamic model, which as specified, is identifiable from the 
control data only. 
Using data from the experiment, Attanasio, Meghir, and Santiago (2012) 
identify a richer model (in some dimensions) that implies a more general cost-
of-school function. Like Todd and Wolpin (2006), they set up a forward-looking 
model of educational choice through high school, where the individuals and their 
families decide each period whether to attend school. The benefits of schooling 
accrue in the future through better labor market opportunities, identified by the 
observed schooling attendance in the control group. A more general specifica-
tion would use observations on the subsequent career to improve identification. 
The cost of schooling is affected by four elements: 1) forgone child labor income; 
2) the amount of the PROGRESA grant for which the individual is eligible if 
attending school, which varies by the age of the child; 3) past school attendance, 
which may reduce cost because of habits or because past learning makes schooling 
now easier; and 4) an unobserved cost of attending school associated with the 
child’s scholastic ability.
This structural model is explicitly dynamic: each year of schooling adds to 
human capital and future standards of living; there is uncertainty over whether the 
child will pass the grade; the grant is only available up until age 18; and current 
attendance affects future costs. The key point is that the model in Attanasio, Meghir, 
and Santiago (2012) allows the PROGRESA grant to have a different effect from the 
wage: the authors use the experimental variation to identify this extra effect. The 
finding is that the impact of the grant is larger than that predicted by the changes 
in school attendance as a function of forgone wages. This finding poses important 
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questions of interpretation, but it highlights that the experiment allows the model 
to be extended and to address directly whether the grant has a different effect from 
the standard opportunity cost. The use of the experiment allowed the relaxation 
of some of the restrictions from economic theory, thus broadening the scope of 
the model and the interpretation of the experimental results. A further develop-
ment of the model would require explaining why the grant has a different impact 
than forgone wages. Attanasio, Meghir, and Santiago speculate that this has to do 
with intrahousehold allocations and the fact that the grant goes to women. From 
the point of view of the discussion here, progress in understanding would require 
adding such an intrahousehold component and thinking about ways to identify it.
Of course, it is important not to overstate the synergies between structural 
models and experiments: in most cases, randomized experiments only offer discrete 
sources of variation—policy is on or off—which is far from the requirements for 
identification in dynamic models, which would typically require continuous varia-
tion (Heckman and Navarro 2007).
The above example illustrates how the experiment can add to the identifi-
cation potential of the structural model. But what does the structural model add 
to the experiment? We know how the experiment affected school attendance at 
various ages. What does the model offer in addition to this finding, and what are the 
assumptions on which any additional insights are based? 
The basic gain from using the structural models is that they allow a better under-
standing of the mechanisms and analysis of counterfactuals. Attanasio, Meghir, 
and Santiago (2012) focus on counterfactuals: for example, we can ask whether 
the grant, which varies by age of the child, would be more effective if structured 
differently over age, holding total financial cost constant. In terms of mechanisms, 
Attanasio, Meghir, and Santiago discuss the potential role of intrahousehold alloca-
tions; but the age limitation of the grant is an important factor in its effect. They 
also estimate whether the impact on wages resulting from the change in child labor 
supply dampened significantly the effect of the program—it did not. A richer model 
could look at how the program affected risk and risk sharing in the community, thus 
changing decisions including that of school attendance. Todd and Wolpin (2006) 
also investigate impacts on fertility. These rich behavioral models offer a deeper 
insight of just how an intervention can affect the final outcome. Understanding 
the mechanisms is central to designing policies and avoiding unintended effects as 
well as for building a better understanding of whether a policy can reasonably be 
expected to work at all.
The extra richness offered by the model does not come for free. We need to 
make additional assumptions that were not required for the simple experimental 
evaluation. Consider the counterfactual that restructures the PROGRESA grant 
by adjusting the amounts offered at each age. The ability to assess this proposal 
depends on knowing how education participation varies with the grant at different 
ages. The amount of the grant did vary with age; however, each age is associated 
with just one amount mandated by the program—there is no age-by-age experi-
mental variation (although conceptually there could be). To recover how the 
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effect of the grant varies by age, we need to assume that this effect varies smoothly 
and does not follow the exact pattern of variation of the grant by age. One can 
be understandably skeptical of results that rely on untestable assumptions about 
preferences. However, the assumptions in these models tend to be explicit, so 
promoting transparency and allowing for explicit criticism and improvements. For 
the purpose of this paper, it provides a good example of the types of assumptions 
that often need to be made to extend the narrow conclusions of an experiment 
to a broader context. In a more complex experiment, one can imagine that the 
amounts themselves within the experiment would be randomized at each age—
thus offering stronger identification of this effect. In practice, it is very hard to 
implement experiments that are complex enough to offer variation in all the direc-
tions required for identification of all desired insights and still have sample sizes to 
allow sufficient statistical power. 
Structural models include further restrictions. For example, they often 
require assumptions about the distribution of random preferences. In Attanasio, 
Meghir, and Santiago (2012), it is assumed that psychic costs of education can 
be described by a mixed logistic distribution. A central question in this literature 
is whether such assumptions are needed, or if they could be relaxed with richer 
data. In an enlightening paper, Magnac and Thesmar (2002) argue convincingly 
that a dynamic discrete choice model, such as the one in Attanasio, Meghir, and 
Santiago (2012), does depend on identifying assumptions relating to the distribu-
tion of preferences. The reason is quite intuitive because all outcome variables 
are discrete. 
More can be achieved in models with continuous variables: Heckman and 
Navarro (2007) develop identification in a dynamic Roy model of education and 
wages. As they emphasize, the key to identification of the dynamic model is that 
they use information on measured consequences of treatment—for example, on 
wages. They show that identification restrictions can be relaxed if one observes 
explicitly a continuous outcome variable, such as the wage rate, and if the dynamic 
discrete choice depends on some continuous variable with large support, such as 
school fees (see also Meghir and Rivkin 2011). In practice, such conditions are 
usually not met and the functional form restrictions will play a role in analyzing 
the actual dataset. Heckman and Navarro (2007) also emphasize the use of cross-
equation restrictions implied by the theoretical structure of the model. Here there 
is an important distinction to be made between restrictions on the shape of distri-
butions of unobservables, for which there is rarely any theory, and restrictions that 
follow a clear reasoning and foundation in theory. While we should minimize ad 
hoc restrictions, it is also important to realize that empirical analysis can never 
do away with theoretical foundations and still remain useful as a learning tool. 
Data from a randomized experiment can however be very helpful here, either in 
showing that despite the various functional form assumptions, the model matches 
the unbiased results of the experiment, or in using the experiment to ensure that 
the resulting estimates reproduce the impacts. In this sense, the experiment can 
aid in identification.
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Combining randomized experiments and credible quasi-experimental varia-
tion with structural models seems to bring together the best of both approaches 
of empirical economics: it identifies causal effects non- or semi-parametrically for 
specific policies, provides useful identifying information for the structural model, 
and offers a coherent way for understanding mechanisms and counterfactuals 
through the organizing lens of economic theory. This approach is growing in 
influence: beyond the papers already cited, Duflo, Hanna, and Ryan (2012) use a 
structural model to analyze the results of a school monitoring experiment in India; 
Kaboski and Townsend (2011) combine information from quasi-experimental 
evidence from the Thailand Million Baht Village Program with a structural model 
of small family businesses to understand the mechanisms underlying the workings 
of microfinance (see also Garlick 2016); and Voena (2015) uses differences-in-
differences to evaluate the effect of divorce laws on household behavior and then 
uses this data to fit a dynamic intrahousehold model with limited commitment in 
order to analyze policy counterfactuals.
Solving Structural Models
The specification issues discussed above are driven both by the importance of a 
well-focused and empirically identified economic model as well as by computational 
feasibility. There have been huge advances in both computational methods and 
power over the last 30 years allowing much more flexibility in what can be imple-
mented in practice. However, computational constraints remain and to some extent 
will always be with us. In this section, we discuss computational issues relating to 
solving these models, which is where most of the difficulty lies. We use Low, Meghir, 
and Pistaferri (2010) loosely as a case study and discuss in particular the computa-
tional implications of relaxing the separability assumptions. 
In some situations, structural estimation is simple and relies on linear methods: 
for example, estimating demand systems in static models or estimating Euler equa-
tions with complete markets as in Altug and Miller (1990) or even with incomplete 
ones as in Meghir and Weber (1996). But more often than not, structural models and 
particularly dynamic stochastic models involve nonlinear estimation, and require 
numerical methods to solve the model to generate moments for estimation. The 
greatest “entry cost” for a researcher wishing to estimate dynamic structural models 
is learning to solve such models accurately and efficiently. For a broader textbook 
discussion of these methods, useful starting points include Adda and Cooper (2003) 
and Miranda and Fackler (2002). Some more recent, faster methods are due to 
Carroll (2006), Fella (2014), and Barillas and Fernández-Villaverde (2007).
The heart of solving dynamic structural models is the computation of value 
functions and corresponding decision rules. The value functions associate a 
numerical value to a decision or set of decisions, conditional on the relevant state 
variables, and conditional on all future decisions being optimal. The decision rules 
describe how individuals behave following different realizations of the economic 
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environment. The state variables describe the economic environment. These 
include variables that are independent of past choices by the agent (and so are 
treated as exogenous) as well as variables that evolve depending on past decisions 
(and so are endogenous).
The discussion below relates to finite horizon life-cycle models. In these 
models, age is part of the state space—which means that the value functions are not 
stationary. There is a class of structural dynamic models with infinite horizons in 
which the value functions are stationary, not depending on age. Equilibrium search 
models of the labor market are usually specified in this way for purposes of conve-
nience. The solution methods for these are related but different, and not touched 
upon here.
In Low, Meghir, and Pistaferri (2010), the decision rules describe whether an 
individual at each age would choose to work and how much the individual would 
save. Decision rules are obtained by comparing the value functions derived from 
different choices, at a given state of the economic environment. The state variables 
are wealth, individual productivity, and the matched firm type. The model makes 
numerous separability assumptions, as discussed above, especially over fertility and 
marriage: neither children nor marriage are considered choices in the model, and 
preferences over consumption and employment are assumed to be separable from 
marriage and fertility. Relaxing these assumptions expands the choice set, increasing 
the number of value function comparisons. It would also expand the state space to 
include current marital status, details of any partner, as well as family size, increasing 
the description of the economy and increasing the number of points at which deci-
sion rules have to be solved. The value of the separability assumptions therefore is 
in reducing the computational burden, as well as in making the model less opaque.
Armed with these decision rules, the researcher can then simulate behavior. 
There are four core steps in solving a dynamic structural economic model.
In the first step, the points (or nodes) of the state space at which the model 
needs to be solved are specified. Numerical solution requires defining the bounds 
of each of the variables, so that one can then think of a multidimensional grid of 
state variables. The state space fully specifies all aspects of the economic environ-
ment which affects the particular choices being analyzed in the model. In Low, 
Meghir, and Pistaferri (2010), the grid of specific values of the exogenous state 
variables, such as the permanent wage, are set before solving the model, using 
approximations to transition probabilities as in Adda and Cooper (2003, chapter 3). 
For endogenous state variables, such as with wealth, restricting the number of values 
to a discrete set would restrict the choice set in an arbitrary way. In Low, Meghir, 
and Pistaferri, this would have meant a discrete set of consumption values, which 
would introduce jumps in behavior that are not observed in the data. We keep these 
endogenous state variables continuous. Discretization can nonetheless be used to 
determine the points where the model is actually solved and then interpolation can 
be used between these points. 
There are many alternative ways to interpolate: linear interpolation is usually 
robust, particularly when decision rules are not smooth, and in Low, Meghir, and 
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Pistaferri (2010), we start with this approach. Other methods of interpolation 
include imposing assumptions about smoothness in the decision rules, which then 
allows fitting either higher-order local splines or, alternatively, polynomials across 
the whole state space to provide a global approximation. The tradeoff here is that 
linear interpolation tends to require more points spanning the state space. Alterna-
tive methods need fewer points in the state space but impose further restrictions on 
the form of the solution. 
Carroll (2006) and Fella (2014) discuss using endogenous grid points which 
are relevant for endogenous state variables. Getting the minimum value of the grid 
right requires care: in Low, Meghir, and Pistaferri (2010), the lower bound on assets 
is determined by an exogenously set borrowing limit. Alternatively, the lower bound 
can be determined by a “no-bankruptcy condition,” specifying that borrowing has 
to be limited to what can be repaid with certainty—a “natural” liquidity constraint.
In the second step, we specify a terminal condition defining the continuation 
value in the subsequent periods beyond which we do not model decisions. In Low, 
Meghir, and Pistaferri (2010), the terminal condition is death, but it does not have 
to be: in Attanasio, Meghir, and Santiago (2012), the terminal condition is defined 
by the oldest age the child could attend high school, taken to be 18. In general 
the terminal value is a function of the state variables at that point. In Attanasio, 
Meghir, and Santiago (2012), the state variable is whatever schooling the child has 
accumulated by that age. The structure of this terminal value function is either tied 
directly to the model, with no new parameters, or it needs to be estimated with 
the rest of the model. Choosing an appropriate terminal point consistent with the 
model can economize on parameters to be estimated and improve identification. 
For example, if it is reasonable to assume that no individual lives beyond say 110 
and that there are no bequests other than accidental ones, then the terminal value 
is defined explicitly by the problem and no extra arbitrary modeling assumptions 
have to be imposed.
In the third step, the “value function” at each node in the state space specified 
on the grid is solved, starting with the terminal period. The solution involves solving 
a numerical optimization problem, or a nonlinear equation solution to a first-order 
condition. The model in Low, Meghir, and Pistaferri (2010) contains a mixture of 
discrete and continuous choices: over whether to participate in the labor market, 
and over how much to save. This combination of discrete and continuous choices 
raises a problem, because changes in asset holdings can lead to changes in partici-
pation status and to jumps in the decision rule for consumption. We deal with this 
nonconcavity by solving for value functions conditional on the discrete choice, and 
then taking the maximum over these. The number of conditional value functions 
to solve increases with the number of discrete choices. However, these conditional 
value functions may themselves not be concave. The solution, numerically, is that 
if there is “enough” uncertainty about changes in future prices or wages then the 
expected value function will typically be concave. Nevertheless, this can rarely be 
proved and depends on the amount of uncertainty in the model. In practice, this 
means that we need to investigate numerically whether multiple solutions occur.
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The fourth and final solution step is to iterate backwards one period at a time, at 
each period solving for each point in the state space. The solution in earlier periods 
will be determined taking account of expectations about future outcomes (based 
on the distribution of potential shocks) and also how the individual will respond 
in the future to those outcomes (based on the already-solved future decision rules. 
Because expectations have to be calculated, this involves numerical integration over 
the unknown random variables: for example, in Low, Meghir, and Pistaferri (2010), 
these are shocks to wages, job offer arrivals, and firm types. The more underlying 
random variables are involved, the higher the dimension of integration and conse-
quently the computational costs can rise exponentially. This factor limits in practice 
the amount and source of uncertainty that one can introduce in a model. Notice 
also that the distribution of the shocks may depend on past realizations (rather than 
being independent and identically distributed). For example, if shocks to wages are 
serially correlated, the realization of a future shock will depend on the value of the 
current shock. This means that the current shock to wages is in the state space: an 
extra exogenous continuous state. For this reason, the way we specify the distribu-
tion of random events is very important in keeping the problem tractable. 
The decision rules solved in this way by backward induction specify what an 
economic actor will choose given any particular realization of the state of the world. 
These decision rules will then be combined with particular randomized realizations 
of the stochastic variables starting at an initial period and simulating forwards. In 
Low, Meghir, and Pistaferri (2010), the randomized realizations are of permanent 
shocks to wages, and of wage offers, firm type, and job destruction. These stochastic 
shocks are responsible for life-time career paths being so different for what otherwise 
appear to be identical individuals. Inputting one complete set of realizations of these 
stochastic variables into the decision rules generates the life-cycle path for consump-
tion and labor supply for one individual. This calculation is then repeated a number 
of times to generate average life-cycle profiles, along with other moments that are 
needed. We return below to the issue of the number of repetitions when discussing 
implementation of this approach using the simulated method of moments. 
Using Method of Moments for Estimation of Structural Models
The numerical solution is used to generate predictions about behavior for a 
given set of parameter values. These parameter values need to be estimated.
Estimation of dynamic structural models involves nonlinear optimization with 
respect to the unknown parameters. However, the key difficulty with this estima-
tion is that we cannot express analytically the functional relationship between the 
dependent variables and the unknown parameters. In order to see how a change 
in a parameter changes the dependent variable, the entire model solution needs 
to be generated afresh. If solving the model once already takes time, the problem 
is compounded by estimation that requires solving the model repeatedly. More-
over, numerical approximation errors in the solution of the model can compound 
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the estimation complexity. There is an active literature on the way to approach the 
problem: one is the nested fixed point algorithm (Rust 1987), where the model is 
solved for each set of parameters that are tried out by the numerical optimization 
algorithm. A recent alternative, which under certain circumstances can be faster, is 
the method of Su and Judd (2012). 
Beyond the choice of algorithm for optimization, another important choice is 
the criterion function to be optimized as a function of the parameters. Tradition-
ally, maximum likelihood was used for estimating structural models. This approach 
is most efficient, exploiting all the information in the specification. However, 
constructing the likelihood function is impossible or computationally intractable 
for many models. Estimation now typically uses the method of moments (or indi-
rect inference) (for a formal discussion, see McFadden 1989; Pakes and Pollard 
1989; Gourieroux, Monfort, and Renault 1993). For our purposes, we use the term 
moments in a broad sense to mean any statistic of the data whose counterparts 
can be computed from model simulations for a given set of model parameters. For 
example, moments include means, variances, and transition rates between states, as 
well as regression coefficients from simple “auxiliary” regressions.
With the method of moments, it is easier to tell which features of the data iden-
tify which structural parameters. Further, use of multiple datasets is straightforward 
and the researcher can put emphasis on fitting moments central to the analysis. 
Finally, this method eliminates the computational burden of using enormous 
administrative datasets with millions of observations: the data moments need only 
be computed once; the computational burden will then be due exclusively to the 
time it takes to solve the model. The downside of this approach is that it does not 
use all information in the data, and we do not have an easily implementable way of 
defining which moments need to be used to ensure identification. One must care-
fully define what are the key features of the data that will identify the parameters. 
Moreover, in finite samples, the results may be sensitive to the choice of moments.
In Low, Meghir, and Pistaferri (2010), we need to estimate the parameters 
governing the opportunity set, which include the wage process, job destruction, job 
arrival rates on and off the job, fixed costs of working, and the parameters, which 
include the discount rate, elasticity of intertemporal substitution, and disutility of 
work. Estimation of these parameters can be described in a five-step algorithm: 
1) Start with an initial guess at a set of parameter values θ. 
2) Numerically solve the model given the parameter vector θ (as described in 
the previous section). 
3) If individuals are ex ante identical, simulate the careers of say S individuals 
using a random number generator for realisations of the stochastic variables, and 
construct moments from the simulated moments analogous to those constructed 
from the data. If individuals differ by exogenous observed factors, simulate S careers 
for each value of the exogenous initial conditions. Similarly if individuals differ by 
some unobserved characteristic (whose distribution is estimated together with the 
rest of the model) again simulate S careers for each point of support of the unob-
servable and then take suitable weighted averages when constructing the moments.
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4) Calculate the “criterion function” being minimized. This may be a simple or 
weighted quadratic distance between the data and the simulated moments.
5) Update the set of parameters θ to minimize the criterion function and return 
to step 2 and numerically solve the model with the updated parameters. 
There are many decisions in implementing this algorithm. Here we discuss 
the main ones: what parameters to estimate, what moments to use, how to weight 
the moments, how to optimize to minimize the criterion, and post-estimation, what 
checks to carry out. 
Choosing the Parameters to Estimate
A fully specified economic model requires that all parameters governing the 
opportunity set and preferences be determined, which can often make the problem 
unmanageable. The set of parameters can be divided into three: First, some param-
eters of the economic environment can be obtained directly from the institutional 
setting or data, requiring the assumption that the particular aspect of the environ-
ment is not affected by economic choices made within the model. For example, in 
Low and Pistaferri (2015), the specification of how health shocks evolve was esti-
mated directly from the data, requiring the assumption that labor supply and other 
choices did not affect health.
Second, some parameters can be obtained using a partially specified model. 
Parameters estimated in this way are robust to details of the fully specified struc-
tural model. For example, Attanasio, Levell, Low, and Sanchez-Marcos (2017) use 
an Euler equation to estimate the elasticity of intertemporal substitution to use in 
a fully specified model. Low, Meghir, and Pistaferri (2010) and Low and Pistaferri 
(2015) estimate the wage process using a reduced-form procedure with the resid-
uals identifying the wage uncertainty. The disadvantage of the procedure is that 
estimation is not completely in tune with the fully specified model. However, what 
may seem to be a shortcoming can also be an advantage: using the partially speci-
fied model means many auxiliary assumptions are not imposed on all components 
of the model. 
Finally, parameters that are the key drivers of the economic choices in the 
model form part of the full structural estimation. In Low, Meghir, and Pistaferri 
(2010), these parameters were the disutility of work, the fixed cost of work, and job 
market frictions. In Low and Pistaferri (2015), these parameters also included the 
acceptance probabilities onto disability insurance. 
Selecting Moments
More moments are not necessarily helpful in practice: moments need to be 
economically important to the model and informative about parameters. In Low, 
Meghir, and Pistaferri (2010), key moments were employment rates and unemploy-
ment duration at different ages. Employment rates were related to fixed cost of 
work, and durations were related to job arrival rates, although both sets of param-
eters affect both moments through the structure of the model. Moments used 
may include reduced form regressions, population means, or elasticities from the 
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literature. Low and Pistaferri (2015) use coefficients from a regression of consump-
tion on health status as moments to inform how health shocks affect the marginal 
utility of consumption. Other important moments may be transition rates, disper-
sion, and the time series properties of wages.
Simulating these moments in step 3 of the algorithm above requires randomly 
generated variables to represent the exogenous stochastic processes in the struc-
tural model. For each individual simulated, there is a random realization for each 
stochastic process. The complete set of random numbers for all individuals should 
be generated only once at the start of the estimation, and the same set of random 
numbers should be used in each iteration of the criterion function. As the number 
of simulations increases to infinity, the simulation error goes to zero, implying the 
moments become equal to the theoretically implied ones. At this point we are only 
left with the usual sampling error from the data. In general, due to the number 
of simulations being finite, simulation error should be taken into account in 
computing the standard errors of the estimated parameters.
The distributions of the stochastic processes may depend on parameters that 
need to be estimated. In order to make sure the underlying random draws are 
the same across iterations we need to draw uniform (0, 1) random variables that 
can then be transformed to follow whatever distribution the model implies (for 
example, N(0, σ2) where σ2 is estimated).
Weighting the Moments
Moments may not be of equal economic importance, or measured with equal 
precision, or measured in comparable units. These considerations determine 
the choice of weighting matrix on the moments. Alternatives are the inverse of 
the full variance–covariance matrix, the inverse of the diagonals of the variance– 
covariance matrix, the identity matrix, or conversion of deviations into percentage 
deviations. 
The “optimal weighting matrix” is the inverse of the variance–covariance matrix 
of the moments. This puts greater weight on more precisely estimated moments, and 
corrects the weighting on moments that are correlated. Ruge-Marcia (2012) shows the 
advantages of this weighting in a Monte Carlo exercise. However, with small samples, 
Altonji and Segal (1996) emphasize that the identity matrix (that is, equal weighting) 
may be the best choice because using hard-to-estimate higher-order moments of the 
data that constitute the weight matrix may actually introduce substantial bias. Equal 
weighting does not differentiate the precision with which each moment is estimated, 
and the units of measurement affect the weighting. The moments can be normalized 
to convert the difference between moments into the percentage deviation, which is 
equivalent to using a matrix of the inverse of the moments in the data squared. An 
alternative is the inverse of the diagonals of the variance–covariance matrix, but the 
issue remains that the more precisely measured moments get more weight, regardless 
of how important the moments are for the question at hand.
In Low, Meghir, and Pistaferri (2010), labor participation rates are precisely 
measured, whereas duration-of-unemployment numbers are imprecisely measured. 
The Use of Structural Models in Econometrics     53
Weighting based on precision with which moments are estimated would have meant 
durations would fit poorly, reducing the relevance of the model. In that study, we 
reduce the scope of this problem by using only economically relevant moments of 
the data and converting the moments to be percentage deviations. 
Optimization with Simulated Moments
Simulated moments are often not smooth with respect to the parameters and 
as a result, derivative-based methods of optimization are often inappropriate. A 
straightforward method is Dantzig’s classic simplex method. The simplex method is 
derivative-free and while it can be computationally slow, it is robust. Recently, Markov 
Chain Monte Carlo methods for optimization have become more common. This 
approach requires no more than simulating the model and computing moments 
given a set of parameters. Chernozhukov and Hong (2003) have shown how Markov 
Chain Monte Carlo can provide estimators that are asymptotically equivalent to 
minimizing the method-of-moments criterion. While the Markov Chain Monte 
Carlo can be slow to converge on some occasions, in practice other alternatives may 
be much worse. Many researchers make use of parallel computing with multiple 
chains running at the same time.
Standard Errors and Post-Estimation Checks
After the parameters are estimated in a structural economic model, the list of 
tasks is not yet complete: additional checks are needed.
First, calculate parameter standard errors. Various papers on simulated 
method of moments and indirect inference like McFadden (1989), Pakes and 
Pollard (1989), and Gourieroux, Monfort, and Renault (1993) provide the appro-
priate results. A practical difficulty is that these approaches require derivatives of 
the moments with respect to the parameters of the model. Another difficulty arises 
from the fact that the estimation error in pre-estimated parameters also needs to be 
taken into account. This correction can become computationally hard. 
Second, use the finite difference approach in the first check to show how 
moments change with estimated structural parameters. This information helps 
make estimation more transparent, by showing which parameters are pinned down 
by which moments. 
Third, show the 95 percent confidence interval for the difference between each 
simulated moment and its data counterpart. This provides a metric for judging how 
well moments fit. In Low and Pistaferri (2015), for example, the model could not 
match the participation rates of the healthy who were over 45. 
Finally, consistency should be checked between any estimates from the partially 
specified or pre-estimation stage and the implications of the fully specified model. 
In Low and Pistaferri (2015), the wage process was pre-estimated with a reduced 
form selection correction. Data on the simulated individuals was used after the esti-
mation to check consistency of the full model with the selection model. A further 
test compares simulated predictions with additional moments or reduced form 
evidence, preferably not targeted in estimation. An important validation of Low 
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and Pistaferri was to compare the simulated elasticities of the receipt of disability 
insurance with respect to generosity to the reduced form estimates in the literature. 
The ultimate purpose is to produce an estimated model that is internally consis-
tent, so the estimates can be used for counterfactual analysis. Being explicit about 
each of these steps can help to provide transparency about the mechanisms and the 
sources of identification. 
Conclusion
Structural economic models are at the heart of empirical economic analysis, 
offering an organizing principle for understanding data, for testing theory, for 
analyzing mechanisms through which interventions operate, and for simulating 
counterfactuals. It has been long understood that econometric identification of such 
models will necessarily depend on prior assumptions and on theory; but without the 
organizing device of theory, it is impossible to make progress in our understanding. 
We argue that the resurgence and increased popularity of the idea of combining 
randomized experiments or plausible quasi-experimental variation together with 
structural economic models can strengthen the value of empirical work substan-
tially. Indeed, researchers should think more ambitiously and use theory to define 
experiments that need to be run to test and estimate important models.
Structural economic models are difficult to use because of computational 
complexity. Moreover, it is easy to end up with overcomplicated and unwieldy models 
that offer little insight into mechanisms and whose identifiability is, to say the least, 
obscure. The trade-off between providing the necessary complexity to be economi-
cally meaningful and maintaining transparency is at the heart of good structural 
modeling. Our approach is to be explicit about what separability assumptions can 
be invoked: a fully specified structural model will not capture all choices, but will be 
explicit about which choices are part of the model and which choices are not, and 
will solve explicitly for all choices in the model. Choices can be left out of a model 
if they do not affect the choices we are modeling, due to separability in preferences. 
With the increasing use of structural models and the progress of both computa-
tional power and numerical methods, the economics profession is becoming much 
more familiar and skilled in the specification and use of structural models. In our 
view, this all for the good, and it is hard to see how progress can be achieved without 
both sides of empirical work: experiments generating exogenous variation, and 
theory-based models.
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